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HOW ACTIVE COLLABORATION AFFECTS INNOVATION ADOPTION BY 
WEAKER AND STRONGER FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Existing research fails to explain why firms with weaker capabilities sometimes reach 
innovation adoption levels similar to those of their stronger competitors, even for competence-
enhancing innovations. We argue that differential benefits from active collaboration with 
external partners helps explain this puzzle. Firms with weaker capabilities benefit more from 
collaboration owing to greater marginal benefit from using partners’ resources and greater 
openness to learning from partners. We test our prediction using survey and archival data on 
Internet banking activities of 153 U.S. banks spanning 1995-2002. The results find differences in 
the impact of collaboration involving what we refer to as “old environment” and “new 
environment” capabilities. 
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Incumbents differ in how extensively they adopt technological innovations that enter 
their industries. Traditional explanations of the difference have focused on the strength of firm 
capabilities, suggesting that firms with stronger capabilities have advantages over weaker firms 
so long as the emerging innovations enhance firms’ existing competence (Abernathy & Clark, 
1985; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that weaker firms 
can sometimes approach or even surpass their stronger competitors, even for competence 
enhancing innovatoins. Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2000: 1123), for instance, indicated 
that pharmaceutical firms “positioned least favorably adopt most aggressively”. One set of 
explanations for this seemingly odd result is that stronger firms may be over-confident or focus 
too intensely on current customers (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Christensen, 1997), leaving space for 
weaker firms to be aggressive. However, this explanation requires a substantial degree of 
bounded rationality by the stronger firms. This paper studies a complementary explanation that 
does not rely on bounded rationality, which is that stronger and weaker incumbents may realize 
differential benefits from actively collaborating with partners to introduce innovations.  
Prior research shows that collaboration with external partners can help firms adopt 
innovations more extensively than competitors when innovations enter an industry (Sivadas & 
Dwyer, 2000; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). Active collaboration, which is the degree to which a firm 
cooperates with external agents to adopt a new service, offers access to capabilities that fill voids 
in firms’ resource endowments (Teece, 1992; Mitchell & Singh, 1996; Jap, 1999; Dyer, 1997). 
Research has spent less time, however, discussing which firms will gain greatest benefits from 
active collaboration with partners. This paper argues that collaboration with partners sometimes 
helps weaker firms keep up with or even surpass their stronger competitors when innovations 
diffuse through an industry. We suggest that relative to stronger firms, weaker capability firms 
may achieve higher returns-to-collaboration when adopting innovations; the difference arises 
because weaker firms experience greater marginal benefit from using their partners’ resources 
and also have greater openness to learning from partners. Thus, the paper extends research on the 
link between collaboration and innovation adoption by arguing that a firm’s capability level  
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moderates the extent to which collaboration contributes to innovation adoption.  
We investigate these ideas in the context of U.S. banks adopting transactional Internet 
banking services between 1995 and 2002. We were able to obtain detailed information about the 
extent of innovation adoption involving multiple on-line banking services, degree of 
collaboration, and three types of capabilities (technical, marketing, and PC banking experience). 
We find intriguing differences in the impact of collaboration involving what we will refer to as 
“old environment” and “new environment” capabilities.   
BACKGROUND 
Innovation Adoption and Firm Capabilities  
Innovation is “the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, 
products or services” (Thompson, 1965: 36). By extent of innovation adoption we mean the 
degree to which a firm accepts and deploys an innovation by some given point in time (Downs & 
Mohr, 1976; Rogers, 1983). Innovation can be radical, destroying the value of existing resources 
by changing core product and service components or by altering architectural linkages among 
them (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990). More often, though, innovation 
complements and enhances existing competencies (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Abernathy & Clark, 
1985). For instance, McGahan (2004: 91) found that progressive change that does not disrupt 
core assets and occurs within an industry’s framework is the most common form of change.   
Internet banking, which this paper examines, is a new automated delivery channel for 
traditional and new banking products. Internet banking innovation is competence-enhancing in 
the sense that it does not threaten banks’ core competencies as financial intermediaries that take 
deposits and make loans.  As Tushman and Anderson (1986: 445) noted, “competence-enhancing 
advances permit existing firms to exploit their competence and expertise”. Internet banking 
exploits banks’ existing activities and customer markets. Although Internet banking may require 
a shift in information technology activities, the services do not depart from banks’ primary 
business or primary value-added activities. Because the adoption of Internet banking requires 
know-how related to hardware, software, and online markets, weaker firms may be  
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disadvantaged. Lacking absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) that provides the existing 
technical and marketing skills to learn new technology skills or abstract online customer needs, 
weaker capability firms may face knowledge barriers to innovation adoption.  
Capabilities are intangible and firm-specific routines that develop over time through 
learning-by-doing and firm investments (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Capabilities are embedded 
within the firm, causally ambiguous, and difficult to imitate (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982). Further, capabilities provide the absorptive capacity to recognize, understand, 
assimilate, and commercialize innovations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
Three bodies of work suggest that firms with stronger capabilities have advantages when 
adopting competence-enhancing innovations. First, the resource-based view posits that strong 
internal capabilities provide firms with enduring advantages in their current business (Penrose, 
1959). Second, evolutionary economics suggests that current capabilities serve as platforms that 
support competence-enhancing innovation (Helfat & Raubitscheck, 2000; Podolny & Stuart, 
1995) and provide the basis for learning about such innovations (Dosi, 1988; Klepper & Simons, 
2000). Third, the industrial organization literature points to advantages of stronger firms in 
innovation adoption. Rose and Joskow (1990) found that firm size in the electric utility industry 
affects economies of scale, increasing a firm’s willingness to innovate early. Hannan and 
McDowell (1984) found that firm size and market concentration drive bank adoption of ATMs, 
for instance, while Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) showed that firm market share increases a 
firm’s likelihood of adopting optical scanners in grocery stores. Despite stronger firms’ 
advantages, active collaboration with partners may help weaker firms reach beyond the lower 
levels of innovation adoption they would achieve if they solely relied on their own capabilities.  
We argue that collaboration often creates greatest benefits for weaker firms. We first 
discuss the benefits of collaboration for all firms and then argue for superior returns-to-
collaboration for weaker firms.   
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Collaboration and Innovation Adoption 
Firms often lack all the capabilities to develop innovations on their own (Radnor, 1991; 
Schilling & Steensma, 2002). If other firms already possess the innovation, as is often the case 
with technologies imported into industries, outsourcing offers a viable alternative to in-house 
development (Lambe & Spekman, 1997). The degree of outsourcing is the extent to which a firm 
engages in external arrangements with supply-side agents to develop new goods and services, 
rather than develop them internally. Several studies have shown that outsourcing relationships 
can provide access to resources that help firms develop new goods and services (Pennings & 
Harianto, 1992; Teece, 1992; Sampson, 2005), facilitate faster adoption (Sivadas & Dwyer, 
2000), and assist innovation performance (Borys & Jemison, 1989).  
Nonetheless, although external sourcing provides access to resources, it does not ensure 
that a firm can actually learn and use its partner’s skills and knowledge (Mody, 1993). Indeed, 
outsourcing by itself may interfere with innovation by creating organizational barriers and 
coordination problems in the innovation process (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Therefore, to gain 
potential innovation benefits from outsourcing, firms often need to collaborate actively with their 
partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
Collaboration is the degree to which a firm actively cooperates with partners to adopt 
new goods. Active collaboration entails frequent interactive information exchange and 
coordination, whereas arms-length relationships require minimal interaction. The literature 
suggests that active collaboration facilitates innovation adoption by improving a firm’s learning, 
understanding, and application of an innovation (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpandé, 1992; 
Simonin, 1997). Further, active collaboration fosters developing relation-specific know-how, 
shared language, and routines between partners that reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings 
and increases efficient knowledge transfer (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).  
Thus, research suggests that stronger capabilities and active collaboration with partners 
will each contribute to innovation adoption, but does not examine the joint effect of collaboration 
and capabilities. We next argue that weaker firms benefit more from collaborating to innovate.     
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RETURNS TO COLLABORATION BY STRONGER AND WEAKER FIRMS 
We argue that collaboration may offer differential advantage to weaker firms for two 
reasons. First, weaker firms derive greater marginal benefit from using partners’ resources. 
Second, weaker firms have greater openness to learning from partners.  
Weaker Firms Derive Greater Marginal Benefit from Partners 
Stronger firms may gain less marginal benefit from collaboration relative to weaker 
competitors for two reasons: Diminishing marginal returns and greater redundancy of 
knowledge. First, because weaker firms have a lower starting level of internal capabilities, 
collaborating with external knowledge providers offers them stronger contributions to 
innovation, relative to stronger firms (Ahuja, 2000). Because stronger firms are closer to the 
technical and market frontiers, it is harder for them to gain additional innovative capacity from 
their partners beyond the capacity they attain on their own, no matter how extensively they 
collaborate (Jap, 1999). The idea of diminishing returns builds on industrial organization 
research linking firms’ resource endowments and their subsequent marginal returns from 
innovation (Henderson, 1993). Further, Parente (1994) observed that given the firm-specific 
nature of learning and resources, firms encounter costs when adopting innovation because not all 
of their existing know-how applies to the new technology. Such costs tend to be higher for 
stronger than weaker firms. Similar differences may arise in collaborative relationships because 
only part of a firm’s capabilities may be usable with its partner’s skills.  
A second reason why weaker firms may achieve greater marginal benefit from 
collaborating with external knowledge providers stems from knowledge redundancy. For 
stronger firms, much of the knowledge a partner possesses may be redundant (Mowery, Oxley, 
& Silverman, 1996) resulting in fewer opportunities to transfer novel information (Granovetter, 
1973; Rogers, 1983). Therefore, although both stronger and weaker firms may gain learning 
benefits from collaboration, weaker firms are likely to gain greater incremental benefits due to 
less redundant knowledge and a lower starting level.   
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One might question why stronger firms collaborate at all if marginal returns are low. 
There are several reasons. To begin, even in the face of redundancy, partnerships may offer 
benefits if firms lack some of the skills needed to innovate. Further, research has shown that 
firms often form knowledge-based relationships as a way to bolster their reputation (Stuart, 
Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) and reinforce what they know (Moorman et al., 1992). Finally, stronger 
firms may not fully disclose their knowledge given concerns of appropriation, or because they 
may not be aware of all they know, and hence, they enter collaborative relationships although 
they may have little to gain (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
Weaker Firms Have a Greater Openness to Learning from Partners 
Weaker firms may gain more from collaboration because they tend to be more open to 
learning from partners. Prior research on inter-firm links stresses that openness to sharing 
knowledge about relevant strategies and processes is crucial for firms to take advantage of their 
partners’ capabilities (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
Three behavioral influences underlie weaker firms’ greater openness. First, a strong base 
of capabilities can create barriers to knowledge sharing due to firms’ concerns that the partner 
may appropriate their knowledge and apply it in relationships with their competitors (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998). Therefore, stronger firms may implement precautions and safeguards to avoid 
knowledge appropriation by their partner (Heide & John, 1988). At the same time, however, 
those safeguards may limit knowledge flows between partners (Steensma & Corley, 2000), 
reducing the benefits stronger firms derive from collaboration. In contrast, weaker firms may 
face fewer concerns of knowledge appropriation and therefore a greater incentive to be 
transparent to their partner, which is likely to increase benefits from collaboration.  
Second, several research traditions caution that stronger capabilities may interfere with 
learning. To begin, stronger firms are likely to have well-established internal processes for 
managing their current products and services. Evolutionary economics studies show that existing 
capabilities embedded in firm processes and routines may limit a firm’s ability to adapt (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). They argue that capabilities and routines may  
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constrain a firm to local search (Levitt & March, 1988) or the exploitation of known tasks 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). A key reason for this may be that when success exceeds aspiration 
levels, firms perceive less need to search outside the realm of existing activities (Cyert & March, 
1963). Work examining these disruptive qualities of capabilities points to the importance of 
firms working to develop a culture (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) and learning systems (Levinthal 
& March, 1993) that not only exploit current strengths, but also explore new opportunities. 
Further, strong capabilities can turn into rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992). Empirical studies 
(e.g., Henderson 1993; Danneels 2002) have shown that such rigidity may constrain innovation. 
Tripsas and Gavetti’s (2000) study of the adoption of digital imaging at Polaroid suggested that 
managerial beliefs tied to old mental models impeded the development of new processes. We 
extend this literature by suggesting that capabilities may also interfere with efforts to innovate 
through collaboration, because they interfere with learning arising from such efforts.  
Third, even if incorporating a partner’s knowledge does not interfere with existing 
activities, internal personnel may resist using the partner’s knowledge. Part of this resistance 
stems from the fact that a firm’s strength contributes to a not-invented-here syndrome and 
internal procurement bias that leads people to believe that external knowledge is inferior to or 
redundant with their own skills—even when partners offer differentiated value (Katz & Allen, 
1982; Williamson, 1985).  
We note that these behavioral arguments may appear to conflict with the notion of 
absorptive capacity, which posits that firms require a base of internal skills to import external 
skills (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). However, three issues arise. First, 
absorptive capacity may help firms import new skills directly, without partnerships, contributing 
to a direct effect of capabilities on innovation adoption (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Helfat, 
1997). Second, for absorptive capacity to enhance the value of collaboration, firms must be 
willing to work with another party to develop new knowledge, but rigidities and not-invented-
here biases can thwart such efforts (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Third, firms will tend to use their 
absorptive capacity as it relates to recent experience with novel ideas, rather than entrenchment  
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in knowledge of traditional practices (Sampson, 2005). Our empirical analysis sheds light on a 
range of capabilities, involving both strength in the traditional industry and experience in more 
emerging business lines, which helps tease out the impact of such differences. 
Prediction 
In sum, we argue that by a given point after an innovation emerged in an industry, firms 
are able to reach some level of innovation adoption through independent activities. This level is 
likely to be higher for firms with stronger capabilities. Firms can augment their own innovation 
level by engaging in active collaboration with partners, thereby reaching a higher level of 
adoption than they would through independent activities or by arms-length outsourcing. Relative 
to stronger firms, weaker capability firms may achieve higher returns-to-collaboration when 
adopting innovations because they lack redundant capabilities and encounter less resistance to 
using external skills. These higher returns-to-collaboration produce a steeper slope on innovation 
returns to collaboration, which raises the adoption level that weaker firms would reach through 
independent activities. Thus, weaker firms often gain more than stronger firms from an 
equivalent degree of collaboration. The higher returns may enable weaker firms to reach levels 
of innovation similar to those of stronger firms. The logic leads to the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis: The weaker a firm’s capabilities prior to initial adoption, the greater the 
benefits of active collaboration for the firm’s subsequent extent of innovation adoption.  
This hypothesis identifies collaboration as a mechanism for weaker firms to approach the 
innovation levels of stronger competitors. One question is whether collaboration with partners 
helps weaker firms simply approach innovation levels of stronger firms, or whether they can 
surpass them. The answer depends on the nature of the primary barrier that stronger firms 
encounter trying to benefit from collaboration. If the barrier primarily results from diminishing 
marginal returns and redundant capabilities, then collaboration is likely to help weaker firms 
approach rather than surpass stronger firms’ adoption levels. If, though, substantial barriers 
within stronger firms arise from behavioral resistance to incorporating external knowledge, then 
weaker firms may even forge ahead of their stronger competitors.  
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METHODS 
Transactional Internet Banking 
Transactional Internet banking is “the automated delivery of new and traditional banking 
products and services directly to customers through electronic, interactive communication 
channels” (FFIEC 2003: 1). In contrast to information-only websites that provide information 
about a bank’s products, transactional Internet banking allows customers to bank online through 
services such as account inquiry, transfer between accounts, and bill payment (OCC, 2000). 
Banks vary widely in the range of services they offer online, including traditional banking (e.g., 
applying for mortgages, paying loans) and non-traditional banking (e.g., website hosting, e-
marketplaces, account aggregation, and data processing services).  
Internet banking has experienced dramatic growth since 1995, when the first Internet-
only bank and first Internet program of an established bank began. While less than 2% of all 
national banks had adopted Internet banking by 1998, about 37% of national banks had Internet 
banking by 2000 and over 50% by 2002 (OCC/FDIC). The setting suits this study since vendor 
links to adopt new technology are widespread among banks. Of the estimated $130 billion the 
banking industry spent on IT in 2002, about 35% went to outsourcing (McKendrick, 2002). 
Further, banks vary widely in the degree to which they collaborate and outsource adoption of 
technological innovations. Banks may buy turnkey applications for in-house use or rely on 
vendors to perform services for them at the vendor’s location. Finally, as we argued above, 
Internet banking is a competence-enhancing innovation that builds on banks’ core competencies 
as financial intermediaries. Nonetheless, in order to operate online and market to customers in a 
new online media banks need to expand their technical and marketing skills. Vendors can 
contribute to these skills and knowledge.    
Data and Sample 
We used both archival sources and a survey to gather data. We collected archival data 
from annual Reports on Condition and Income that banks periodically file with U.S. regulatory 
agencies. We obtained additional archival data (e.g., IT investments and marketing expenses)  
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directly from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), because standardized public 
online reports did not include this information.  
We administered a survey to gather data on U.S. banks’ Internet activities. The FDIC’s 
website lists all FDIC-insured bank holding companies (BHCs), which totaled 5,065 banks in 
December 2000. We randomly sampled 800 BHCs from 2,512 BHCs larger than $100 million in 
assets. In cases of multi-bank holding companies, we sampled the largest entity within the 
holding company. We gathered phone numbers from OneSource Business Browser, Hoovers 
Online, and the Internet, and then obtained informants’ contact information through phone calls 
to banks. The final sample was 747 banks, due to missing contact information for 32 banks and 
the acquisition of 21 banks.  
We surveyed informants in late 2001 and early 2002. We conducted two follow-up 
postcard mailings and follow-up phone calls to banks in February through mid-April 2002. A 
total of 224 (30%) banks responded. Frequently stated reasons for non-response were non-
disclosure policies, time constraints, survey length, and bank acquisition. Investigating non-
response bias, we found no difference between respondents and non-respondents on bank size, 
number of banks in BHC, and loans/deposits. A total of 180 had adopted transactional Internet 
banking, 38 had information-only websites, and 6 had no web presence. Adoption rates of 
transactional Internet banking increased over time: 1995 (1 adoption), 1996 (4), 1997 (12), 1998 
(28), 1999 (33), 2000 (51), 2001 (48), and early 2002 (2); one adopter did not report a date. 
We used a single informant because of the size of most banks’ e-banking department 
(71% had fewer than five employees) and because utilizing multiple informants can create 
problems when a single informant is most knowledgeable (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & 
Sutcliffe, 1990). The informants were highly competent to report on their bank’s online 
activities. Average job and bank tenure was 3.8 and 8.3 years, respectively, which reflects 
substantial experience with Internet banking that first emerged six years before the survey. Most 
informants (71%) were VP-level or higher. Informants rated their involvement in online  
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initiatives, new online functionality, and Internet supplier selection on a 7-point Likert scale. The 
three items are reliable (α = 0.88) and involvement was high (mean = 6.03, s.d. = 1.23).  
We believe that this study does not face the common method bias that sometimes arises 
in survey-based research (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). First, we used archival data to measure 
technical and marketing capabilities, rather than the survey. Second, although the same 
informant provided data on collaboration and innovation adoption, the data are factual rather 
than perceptual. We followed Golden (1992) and Miller, Cardinal, and Glick’s (1997) advice to 
focus informants on facts, rather than beliefs and intentions. Further, respondents had to report 
the date of adoption for each of their bank’s online services offered, which reduces the likelihood 
of over-reporting. Finally, our main findings are based on interaction effects, which are unlikely 
to be distorted by common method variance (Brockner, Siegel, Tyler, & Martin, 1997).  
Measures 
Three steps helped ensure the validity of the measures.
 First, we reviewed bank websites 
and press releases on banks’ Internet strategies. Second, when appropriate, we used measures 
from Internet banking studies conducted by the OCC, interviews with industry experts, and prior 
research on innovation and strategy. Third, we pre-tested the survey with eight Internet banking 
executives and revised the questions based on their feedback. We probed respondents regarding 
whether the questions reflected their experience and whether the survey addressed issues relevant 
to their jobs. No one participating in the pilot testing was an informant in the final survey.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. There are no correlations higher 
than 0.20 among the focal constructs in our study (innovation adoption, three types of 
capabilities, and collaboration). Correlations among control variables were typically less than 
0.30. Therefore, the measures appear to encompass distinguishable domains and provide 
discriminant validity. We describe additional steps that help ensure measure validity in our 
discussion of specific measures.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
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Extent of Innovation Adoption. Since we are interested in how extensively firms adopt an 
innovation, we measure a bank’s extent of innovation adoption as the number of electronic 
services adopted. To assess adoption, we provided informants with a list of 36 online services in 
eight categories (Table2). Eight banking experts reviewed the list to ensure it included all major 
online services available as of 2001. Informants marked the services their bank offered at the 
time of the survey (mean = 13, s.d. = 4.7, range 4-29 services). The dependent measure is a count 
variable accounting for the fact that firms differ in the extent to which they adopt and implement 
an innovation (Cohen & Levin, 1989; Damanpour, 1991). Thus, in contrast to measures that treat 
innovation as dichotomous adoption versus non-adoption, the count variable takes into 
consideration that banks vary greatly in the number of services they offer online.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
To address measure validity, we conducted sensitivity analysis that compared the count 
variable to a difficulty-weighted innovation adoption measure based on expert ratings (Lind & 
Zmud, 1991; Goes & Park, 1997). We asked ten senior executives of technology service 
providers to rate each of the 36 online services on a scale of 1-7 based on how difficult it is for 
an average bank to adopt the service. The experts’ overall inter-rater reliability was α = 0.85. 
Using these ratings, we calculated a measure that weighted the services a bank adopted by their 
difficulty. The difficulty-weighted variable ranged from 12 to 130 with an average of 54 (s.d. = 
22) and correlated highly (r = 0.84) with our innovation adoption count variable used in the 
analysis. In turn, analysis using the difficulty-weighted variable yielded similar results.  
Degree of Collaboration. The collaboration measure captures the degree to which a firm 
has an active collaborative relationship versus arm’s-length relationship with outsourcing 
partner(s). Because collaboration may vary across service categories, we assessed the measure 
for each of the eight categories: Account balance inquiry and funds transfer services; bill 
payment services; bill presentment services; credit/loan/mortgage services; investment (non-
FDIC insured) services; insurance services; non-traditional services (e.g. website hosting, 
account aggregation, virtual mall); and customer relationship management services. We  
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consulted eight banking experts to ensure that these eight categories represented available online 
services. For each service category, informants rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale the degree to 
which their bank’s outsourcing relationships for each type of service were arm’s-length (1) 
versus collaborative (7). Degree of collaboration is the average collaboration across the online 
services a bank offered.  
Capabilities. We define three capability variables relevant to Internet banking adoption. 
First, technical capabilities comprise a firm’s investment flows and knowledge stocks acquired 
in prior activities. Technical capabilities enable a firm to understand and shape an innovation and 
align it with its organizational needs (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Lind & Zmud, 1991). Prior research 
views capabilities as multi-faceted (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Dutta, et al., 1999) and distinguishes 
between stocks and flows of capabilities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Hence, technical 
capabilities are a composite measure of two items: technical intensity and IT strength. The first 
component, technical intensity, captures the flows aspects of technical capabilities, reflecting a 
bank’s IT investment in systems, equipment, and data processing, divided by its total assets to 
correct for firm-size effects (Pennings & Harianto, 1992). The second component, IT strength, is 
a stocks facet of technical capabilities, measuring the degree to which a bank’s technical 
knowledge is relevant for Internet banking. Informants rated their bank’s (i) overall technology 
and IT knowledge and (ii) IT investments or budget upon web launch on 7-point Likert-type 
scales. The two aspects of IT strength correlate (r = 0.59), so we took their mean to measure IT 
strength. Since these two variables have different measurement units, we used a z-transformation 
for each variable to convert them into comparable measurement units, which enables a 
meaningful combination of the two variables without changing the shape of their distribution or 
their relationship to other variables (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  
Second, marketing capabilities reflect a firm’s understanding of customer needs and 
ability to adapt and apply innovations to fit customer needs (Day, 1994; Moorman & Slotegraaf, 
1999). We operationalized marketing capabilities as a composite measure of marketing intensity 
(flows) and marketing scope (stocks). Marketing intensity is a bank’s advertising and marketing  
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expenses divided by its revenues to correct for firm-size effects. Marketing intensity assesses the 
resources a firm spends on sales efforts, market research, and other market-related activities. 
Intensity affects an innovations’ applicability to customers and a firm’s ability to commercialize 
innovations (Dutta et al, 1999). Marketing scope reflects a bank’s experience with a wide range 
of banking products, which we measured as the percentage of income derived from 
nontraditional sources such as investment banking, insurance services, and data processing 
(Furst, Lang, & Nolle 2000). We used z-transformations of marketing scope and marketing 
intensity for the marketing capability measure, which had low correlation with technical 
capabilities (r = -0.06).  
Third, we created a measure that reflects recent experience in other electronic banking 
activities. PC banking experience denotes banks with electronic banking experience prior to 
adopting transactional Internet banking (banks with it 1 and banks without it 0). PC banking 
experience provides knowledge of both a related technology and online customer preferences. 
PC banking requires customers to install the bank’s software on their own PCs in order to 
conduct online transactions. PC banking experience provides banks with knowledge about their 
customers’ willingness to bank remotely and with know-how of the link between electronic 
banking components and traditional back-end systems. Table 1 indicates that PC banking 
experience has only moderate correlation with marketing capabilities (r = 0.28) and insignificant 
correlation with technical capabilities (r = -0.04).  
Control Variables. We control for alternative influences on innovation adoption. 
Economics research shows that firm size creates economies of scale and R&D investment that 
contribute to technology adoption (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993). We measure firm size as the 
log of assets (Dos Santos & Pfeffer, 1995). Publicly-held firms may have less costly access to 
cash and thus are less constrained in their innovative capacity than privately-held firms (Rose & 
Joskow, 1990). We measure privately held as a 0-1 binary variable where 1 reflects private firms. 
Slack resources may increase innovation incentives (Damanpour, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992). We measure slack resources as the percentage of bank assets comprised of cash.   
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Economics research also shows that costs and uncertainty surrounding innovation 
adoption decline over time (Rogers, 1983; Rose & Joskow, 1990). As innovations diffuse 
through an industry they tend to experience technological improvements, which, in turn, are 
likely to increase a firm’s innovation adoption. We measure time of adoption as the months since 
year-end 1995 that elapsed until a bank began to adopt transactional Internet banking. This 
variable also addresses market learning effects that may exist due to banks adopting transactional 
Internet banking at different points in time (Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). 
Prior research stresses the influence of customers on the direction of product 
development and innovation (Von Hippel, 1988; Christensen, 1997; Utterback, 1994). Firms 
with higher net worth customers that tend to be more knowledgeable about the Internet and 
demand more sophisticated services may be more likely to adopt in anticipation of greater 
returns than firms with low net worth customers. Thus, firms with high income customers may 
be more inclined to offer new technology (Levin et al., 1987). We measure customer affluence as 
the ratio of deposit accounts over $100,000 divided by all bank deposits.  
Two variables assessed outsourcing activity. Degree of outsourcing captures the extent to 
which a firm relied on in-house talent versus bought from a third party online services within the 
same eight service categories used to measure collaboration. For each category, informants 
indicated the percentage of online services gained through in-house development (0%) versus 
external arrangements (100%) (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). We calculated the degree of outsourcing 
by summing the percentages of outsourcing across all categories a bank offered and then 
dividing by the total number of online services a bank offered. We also control for number of 
external partners measured as average number of suppliers that a bank had across eight online 
service areas. The variable accounts for skill transfer from collaboration becoming harder as the 
number of external suppliers increases. 
Market structure factors such as concentration, market growth, and market size may 
affect innovation adoption (Goes & Park, 1997; Hannan & McDowell, 1984), although studies of 
market structure and innovation have been inconclusive. For instance, while Levin et al. (1987)  
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found that high concentration in markets slowed innovation adoption, Karshenas and Stoneman 
(1993) showed that firms in concentrated markets had higher incentives to adopt due to greater 
anticipated cost reduction from the new technology. We measure concentration ratio as the four-
firm concentration ratio of deposits in a bank’s market defined by a bank’s number of states of 
operation. We use states rather than bank SMSA’s as market measures because banking 
deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s eliminated county and state barriers.  
Market growth and size may positively impact innovation adoption, by reducing financial 
constraints (Ravenscraft, 1983). We measure market growth as the growth in market deposits in 
a bank’s respective market during the three years leading up to Internet banking adoption. We 
measure market size as the total amount of deposits held by all banks in a respective bank’s 
states of operation (we control for absolute market size rather than market share because the 
analysis already controls for firm size).  
We include two transaction-cost related variables to test endogeneity of outsourcing and 
collaboration. Transaction cost economics argues that tasks become asset-specific as firms invest 
in complex, specialized skills, learning, and equipment (Williamson, 1985). In the context of 
innovation adoption, asset-specificity may increase as firms adopt specialized services that are 
more complex to implement and thus, in turn, require firms to make specific investments in 
learning their partner’s technical systems in order to adopt them. Our asset specificity variable 
assesses the complexity and specialized skill investments associated with the adoption of a 
bank’s initial online portfolio. As banking services become more complex, they tend to become 
more idiosyncratic across vendors. We measured asset specificity by weighting a bank’s initial 
online services by their difficulty of operation and taking the log of Σxijsi, where xi is 1 if bank j 
initially adopted online service i and 0 otherwise and si reflects the difficulty rating for service i.  
Transaction cost economics also argues that uncertainty about the quality of suppliers’ 
offerings can affect a firm’s ability to deliver a new technological application to its customers by 
raising measurement costs, which, in turn favors in-house adoption (Williamson, 1985). Supplier 
uncertainty arose with Internet banking as many technology vendors were small firms that  
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operated in unregulated industries, which may have prompted some banks to outsource less. We 
assess supplier uncertainty on a 7-point scale as the extent to which a bank monitored 
competitors’ online vendor links at the time of adoption. The variable addresses the fact that 
increased knowledge of suppliers decreases the chance of adverse supplier selection (Chi, 1994).  
Statistical Methods 
We use a two-stage sample selection model (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2000) because we 
can only observe extent of innovation adoption for banks that have adopted Internet banking. If 
ignored, we risk misspecification (Shaver, 1998; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) because banks do 
not randomly adopt Internet banking. Adopting an innovation is a managerial choice that 
managers make based their expected future returns from innovation. Therefore, we estimate a 
first-stage Probit model of the likelihood that a bank adopts Internet banking (Table 3). We use 
all respondents in the selection model (221 cases) and all adopters in the innovation adoption 
analysis (153 cases, after omitting 27 cases with missing data).
 Missing variables affected IT 
strength (n=161), degree of collaboration (n=154), and degree of outsourcing (n=172), but 
insignificant t-tests showed that the missing cases were random. We measure independent 
variables at year-end 1995 for the selection analysis and for the year prior to a bank’s Internet 
adoption for the analysis of extent of adoption. We obtain an inverse Mills ratio (λ) from the 
Probit model that we use as control variable in a negative binomial model testing our prediction.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The second-stage model uses methods suited to count variables. Since our dependent 
variable (innovation adoption) indicates over-dispersion in the data, we apply negative binomial 
regression (Hausmann, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Greene, 2000).  
Controlling for a bank’s degree of outsourcing, we focus on the joint effect of firm 
capabilities and degree of collaboration on innovation adoption. Prior research has shown that 
firm capabilities, in addition to transaction-specific factors, sometimes influence governance 
choice (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 2003). For instance, studying the mortgage banking  
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industry Jacobides and Hitt (2005) found that capabilities impacted governance choice measured 
as to whether banks made their own loans, bought their loans, or did both.  
Although these prior studies show that capabilities impact outsourcing rather than 
collaboration, two questions arise when studying the impact of collaboration on innovation 
adoption. First, do firms make inter-firm relationship choices of collaboration and outsourcing 
independently of each other, simultaneously, or sequentially? Second, do firm capabilities 
endogenously determine collaboration?  
The appendix reports sensitivity analyses we performed to ensure that it is appropriate to 
treat collaboration as independent of outsourcing. The core conclusion is that these analyses do 
not find a significant relationship between outsourcing and collaboration, lending support for the 
treatment of outsourcing and collaboration as exogenous choices in our setting. Further, the 
analysis in the appendix indicates that firm capabilities do not significantly influence 
collaboration. Thus, the sensitivity analyses indicate negligible endogeneity in the outsourcing 
and collaboration decisions, so that it is reasonable to treat collaboration and our outsourcing 
control variable as exogenous in this empirical setting.  
RESULTS 
Table 4 tests the joint impact of capabilities and collaboration on innovation adoption. 
Model 1 provides a baseline analysis with capability and control variables. All three capability 
variables are positive. The coefficients for marketing capabilities and PC banking experience are 
significant, suggesting that customer knowledge and recent experience in other electronic 
banking activities may create absorptive capacity to support adoption. Among the controls, firm 
size positively influences innovation adoption, while degree of outsourcing reduces adoption. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Model 2 introduces degree of collaboration. The effect is significantly positive (β=0.031, 
p<0.001), indicating that firms that collaborate more intensively with their external partners 
reach higher levels of innovation adoption. Marketing capabilities and PC banking experience 
continue to have a significant positive impact on adoption. The coefficient for degree of  
  19
outsourcing remains significantly negative in model 2 (β=-0.003, p<0.001); at their means, the 
positive effect of collaboration outweighs the negative effect of outsourcing by about 50%. 
Model 3 tests the core prediction by interacting degree of collaboration with marketing 
capabilities, technical capabilities, and PC banking experience. The result for the Collaboration x 
Marketing capabilities interaction in model 3 is negative and significant (β= -0.044, p<0.001), 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms with weaker capabilities realize more innovation 
adoption from collaboration. Thus, collaboration contributes to innovation adoption more 
strongly for firms weaker on marketing capabilities. By contrast, the prediction does not hold for 
technical capabilities. Although the Collaboration x Technical capabilities interaction is negative, 
as predicted, it is insignificant in model 3 (β= -.007, n.s.), suggesting that firms with stronger 
technical capabilities can collaborate with partners without encountering redundant skills or 
creating internal disruptions that detract from adoption. Hence, collaboration has additional 
benefits for weaker firms only with respect to marketing capabilities. 
PC banking experience also appears to have an insignificant interaction with 
collaboration in model 3 (β=0.038, n.s.) but the results change somewhat in model 4, which 
drops the insignificant interaction of Collaboration x Technical capabilities. Model 4 finds that 
banks with PC banking experience actually gain from collaboration at a moderately significant 
level (β=0.040, p<0.10). We address this result in greater detail in the discussion. We note that 
model 4 provides a significant improvement in explanatory power based on the log likelihood 
ratio test relative to model 2, in which it nests, whereas model 3 did not improve the fit 
significantly. The negative interaction of marketing and collaboration remains highly significant 
in model 4 (β= -0.045, p<0.001). 
To gain insights into collaboration as a differential strategy for firms with weaker 
marketing capabilities, Figure 1a plots the joint effect of marketing capabilities and collaboration 
from Model 4. The figure reinforces our argument. First, stronger marketing capabilities provide 
a higher base level of innovation adoption (the left side of the chart, with low levels of 
collaboration). Second, adoption increases as collaboration increases (the lines slope upward).  
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Third, the “collaboration slope” (contributions beyond the level the firm would have achieved 
without collaboration) is steeper for firms with weaker marketing capabilities. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In parallel with Figure 1a, the estimates in Model 4 of Table 4 enable us to calculate 
adoption parity for firms with weaker and stronger marketing capabilities. We find that, holding 
other variables at a mean level, weaker marketing capability firms with high collaboration 
achieve adoption parity with stronger marketing firms that use extensive collaboration and 
achieve 91% of the adoption level of stronger marketing firms with low collaboration. In 
contrast, weaker marketing capability firms with low collaboration achieve only 75% of the 
adoption level of stronger marketing capability firms with low collaboration. These results 
indicate that firms with weaker marketing capabilities can, through collaboration, achieve a level 
of innovation adoption that at least approaches that of stronger firms.  
Figure 1b graphs the net impact of PC banking experience and collaboration. In contrast 
to Figure 1a, Figure 1b demonstrates that collaboration provides greatest benefit for firms with 
PC banking experience. Without collaboration, firms with or without PC banking experience 
realize similar levels of adoption (the left side of the chart). Collaboration provides benefits for 
both type of firms, but the “collaboration slope” is steeper for firms with PC banking experience. 
We address this difference below. 
DISCUSSION 
This study contributes to the literature on innovation by investigating collaboration with 
partners as an innovation adoption strategy for weaker firms. Previous research shows that firms 
with stronger capabilities fare better in competence-enhancing innovations and also implies that 
firms may support their innovative activities through external partnerships. We extend theory by 
examining whether weaker firms can differentially overcome their lack of capabilities through 
collaboration. We find that a firm’s decision on how actively to collaborate in outsourcing links 
can have important strategic consequences depending on the nature of its capabilities. In 
particular, we find that collaboration can compensate for weaker marketing, but not for a lack of  
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prior PC banking experience or weaker technical capabilities. Thus, we find that marginal 
benefits from active external partnerships vary across capabilities. 
It is useful to consider why firms with prior PC banking experience gain at least 
moderately greater benefits from collaboration. First, PC banking experience may be quite recent 
and thus less depreciated than more traditional know-how. Sampson (2005) showed that firms 
benefit most from recent experience. Second, PC banking experience may be more directly 
applicable to transactional Internet banking than marketing and technical skills that the firm 
developed in prior activities, so that erroneous generalizations from one context to another are 
less likely to cause negative transfer effects (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Levinthal & March, 
1993). PC banking provides firms with know-how of how remote banking services relate to 
existing offline services and back-office systems. By adopting PC banking, banks gain 
experience in installing and customizing software to their firm-specific needs and in delivering 
banking services online. Knowledge of these complex skills may create absorptive capacity that 
enhances the potential benefits of collaboration when adopting Internet banking. Moreover, PC 
banking experience may help a bank look forward toward the requirements of electronic banking 
more generally, making it more receptive to adopting web-based transactional banking, in line 
with prior work showing the benefits of experience that aligns closely with a focal product 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001).  
By contrast, banks with stronger traditional marketing capabilities gained fewer benefits 
from collaboration. In part, this may be because their partners had few novel marketing skills 
from which stronger firms could benefit. In addition, banks with stronger marketing skills may 
face internal resistance to revising customary practices, and so resist importing new skills from 
partners because they believe that they know their customers best, creating inertia due to prior 
experience (Sampson, 2005).  
The key difference is that marketing capabilities largely reflect what one might refer to as 
“old environment” capabilities that may interfere with adopting new services from partners, 
whereas PC banking experience involves “new environment” capabilities that may facilitate  
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collaborative activities. The difference between “old environment” and “new environment” 
capabilities has important implications for weaker firms. On average, weaker firms benefit from 
undertaking exploratory investments in early forms of a new service, which are likely to provide 
windows on subsequent innovations. In our study, a firm with weaker marketing skills that 
experimented with PC banking in the early 1990s would be in a particularly desirable position to 
collaborate extensively in adopting transactional Internet banking. In contrast, firms with 
stronger marketing skills but no PC banking experience are least favorably positioned to benefit 
from collaboration.  
Further, the findings provide insights into the link between collaboration and innovation 
adoption. Separating degree of collaboration from degree of outsourcing, we show that 
collaboration increases adoption, even though outsourcing reduces adoption. Our results 
reinforce the point that firms cannot simply buy from an external supplier to gain advantages, but 
must also work closely with that supplier. Arms-length relationships only enable the transfer of 
observable and codified components (Kogut & Zander, 1992), but do not lead to significant 
information sharing between buyer and supplier (Huber, 1991), the development of architectural 
knowledge, or supplier tailoring, all of which improve learning.  
The major managerial implication of this study is that firms weaker on some capabilities 
can at least approach their stronger competitors in innovation adoption if they engage in 
collaboration with partners. In particular, firms weaker on marketing capabilities are most likely 
to benefit from collaboration in outsourcing relationships, whereas firms lacking recent 
experience with novel related services (PC banking in our study) benefit least. It is important for 
managers to be aware of the composition and strength of their capability portfolio when 
designing strategies for innovation adoption.  
Knowing whether collaborative efforts have substitute or complementary effects on a 
firm’s capability base will help managers in two regards. First, they can see when collaborative 
efforts are most effective and therefore advisable. Second, the findings hint that it is more 
valuable to develop some related capabilities (in our case, PC banking), while weakness in others  
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can be more easily substituted for by collaborative external relationships (in our case, marketing 
capabilities). In turn, these results reinforce the point that stronger firms cannot be complacent—
although stronger capabilities provide substantial advantages, they do not fully determine the 
outcome of innovation adoption processes.  
This study has several limitations that generate new questions. First, the study shows that 
firms with weaker marketing capabilities can gain greater benefits from collaboration, but it does 
not test the mechanisms through which collaboration fosters greater innovation adoption. 
Collaboration may enable firms to internalize some of the partner’s capabilities and build an 
internal capability base that may reduce the need for outsourcing over time. Second, this study 
does not capture details on the nature or intent of collaboration. A firm’s collaboration activities 
may affect innovation differently depending on whether financial, legal, organizational, or 
personal incentives drive the decision to collaborate. Third, future research could investigate 
whether few or multiple sourcing links are better for earlier versus later adopters or weaker 
versus stronger capability firms. A more fine-grained measure of outsourcing links 
distinguishing between providers of R&D, service/product delivery, support, and consulting may 
provide further insights into the collaboration-innovation link. While collaboration may be 
beneficial for some part of the innovation adoption process, it may be detrimental for others. 
Further, the effect of collaboration on innovation may also vary by type of task outsourced. 
Finally, it would be useful to investigate whether the mechanisms that make a firm innovative 
are the same as the mechanisms that enable a firm to commercialize an innovation successfully.  
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TABLE 1. MEASURE CHARACTERISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Innovation adoption 13.18 4.74 4 29 1.00
2 Marketing capabilities -0.03 0.71 -1.29 2.22 0.19 1.00
3 Technical capabilities -0.01 0.74 -1.53 6.38 0.07 -0.06 1.00
4 PC banking experience 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.21 0.28 -0.04 1.00
5 Collaboration 4.44 1.97 1 7 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.03 1.00
6 Outsourcing 87.40 21.60 0 100 -0.28 -0.18 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 1.00
7 Time of adoption 47.78 16.48 1 74 -0.12 -0.30 0.04 -0.23 -0.04 0.20 1.00
8 Size 13.88 1.48 11.67 19.05 0.30 0.19 -0.14 0.22 0.03 -0.19 -0.33 1.00
9 Privately held 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.16 0.01 -0.10 1.00
10 Affluence of customers 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.57 0.15 0.35 -0.06 0.23 0.22 -0.11 -0.08 0.11 0.04 1.00
11 Concentration ratio 0.42 0.09 0.16 0.65 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.17 -0.09 0.18 0.13 -0.48 -0.05 -0.11 1.00
12 Market growth 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.35 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.03 0.30 -0.07 0.03 0.00 0.30 1.00
13 Number of states of operation 1.71 1.98 1 14 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.21 0.04 -0.30 -0.28 0.66 -0.06 0.11 -0.45 0.01 1.00
14 Number of external partners 1.33 0.59 0 4 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.01 0.11 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.05 0.20 0.09 1.00
15 Asset specificity 3.42 0.73 0 4.58 0.36 -0.07 0.06 0.04 0.16 -0.08 0.37 -0.07 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.15 -0.01 0.07 1.00
16 Supplier uncertainty 2.83 1.48 1 7 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.11 1.00
17 Slack resources 0.04 0.02 0 0.13 -0.05 0.32 -0.01 0.25 0.12 -0.07 -0.28 -0.10 0.05 0.41 -0.09 -0.02 0.16 -0.06 -0.13 0.12 1.00
18 Market size 18.70 0.99 15.29 20.63 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.19 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.44 0.05 0.05 -0.42 0.04 0.43 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 1.00
 
 
Note: N=153; correlations greater than 0.15 are statistically significant (p<0.05). 
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TABLE 2. TYPES OF TRANSACTIONAL INTERNET BANKING SERVICES,  
DIFFICULTY RATINGS AND FREQUENCY OF ADOPTION 
 
  
Type of Transactional Internet Banking Service 
  
Service ratings: 
Difficulty of 
implementation 
(1=least, 7=most) 
# of 
Banks 
offering 
each 
Service 
       
Account balance inquiry and funds transfer services     
Account balance inquiry  2.22  175 
Funds transfer between existing accounts at the same bank  2.78  175 
Open a new deposit account online as existing customer  3.89  61 
Integrate banking information with financial software (e.g., Quicken)  4.33  156 
Open a new deposit account online as new customer (no prior banking relationship)  4.89  50 
Checking and savings accounts for small business  3.13  148 
Payroll direct deposit for small business  3.75  96 
Cash transfer for small business  4.25  130 
Integration of banking information with accounting software (e.g., Quick Books)  4.75  114 
Cash management services for small business  4.75  109 
Merchant services for small business  4.75  32 
Bill payment services     
Schedule and pay bills online  4.33  166 
Pay “ANYONE” or “ANY BILL” online  4.89  139 
Bill payment for small business  4.50  122 
Bill presentment services     
Bill Presentment (view bill data from outside billers on the bank’s web site)  5.89  11 
Credit/loan/mortgage services     
View credit card balances  2.67  47 
View existing consumer loan/mortgage balances  2.78  157 
Apply for a credit card online  3.33  40 
Apply for consumer loan/mortgage products online  3.56  79 
Receive real-time approval or rejection for consumer loan/mortgage application online 4.78  14 
Credit products for small business  4.25  45 
Investment (non-FDIC insured) services     
View information on investments (e.g., mutual funds) offered by the bank online  3.44  51 
View balances of investment accounts online  3.44  50 
Open an investment account online  4.56  12 
Purchase investments online (e.g., mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and other securities)  5.67  28 
Insurance services     
View information on insurance products offered through the bank online  3.22  32 
Apply for insurance online (submit an application form online)  4.00  17 
Receive quotes from multiple insurance companies for comparison 5.33  7 
Non-traditional services      
Web site hosting services  3.89  11 
Account aggregation across accounts at the same bank  4.11  48 
Virtual mall  4.67 19 
e-marketplaces  4.67 15 
Account aggregation across unaffiliated institutions  5.78  8 
Wireless access  5.00 6 
CRM (customer relationship management) services     
Single sign-on  5.56 41 
Web site customization (one-to-one customer relationship)  5.22  21 
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TABLE 3. FIRST STAGE PROBIT MODEL OF LIKELIHOOD OF INTERNET 
BANKING ADOPTION 
(Positive coefficients = greater likelihood of adoption by the end of the study period) 
 
  Model  
  
Bank-level factors   
Marketing capabilities 1995  0.31 (0.19) * 
Technical capabilities 1995  -2.88 (7.52) 
PC banking experience 1995  -0.32 (0.25) * 
Size 1995    0.35 (0.11) *** 
Affluence of customers 1995    3.54 (1.27) *** 
Privately held status 1995  0.25 (0.42) 
Number of states of operation 1995  -0.17 (0.12) * 
Information-only website 1995   -0.25 (0.38) 
Source of funding 1995   2.05 (1.33) * 
Past performance (ROA) 1995   -0.35 (1.91) 
Market-level factors   
Concentration ratio 1995  -0.50 (1.10) 
Market growth 1995  -0.65 (1.01) 
  
Intercept   -5.29 (1.97)*** 
  
Cases 221 
Model log likelihood  -82.4 
Model log likelihood ratio (df)      48.4 (12) *** 
Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
 
We use all respondents (n = 221) for the selection model. The first-stage predictors have values as of 1995. 
The text describes the variables for marketing and technical capabilities, PC banking, size, customer 
affluence, privately held status, number of states of operation, concentration ratio, and market growth. We 
add three new variables here: (1) Information-only website (mean = 0.15; s.d. = 0.36) is a dichotomous 
variable of 1 for banks with an information-only website as of 1995 and 0 otherwise. Banks with an 
information-only website in 1995 may be more likely to adopt transactional Internet banking; (2) Source of 
funding (mean = 0.82; s.d. = 0.10) is the ratio of deposits/total assets. Furst, Lang, and Nolle (2000) argue 
that banks less reliant on traditional sources of funding often have a more aggressive business strategy and 
therefore are more likely to adopt Internet banking; and (3) Past performance is measured as return on 
assets (mean = 0.10; s.d. = 0.06) and controls for the fact that more profitable and better performing banks 
have more resources to adopt innovation.  
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TABLE 4. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE JOINT 
EFFECT OF CAPABILITIES AND COLLABORATION ON INNOVATION ADOPTION 
(Positive coefficients = greater extent of innovation adoption) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Intercept  2.072***  1.840*** 1.833*** 1.864*** 
  (0.871)  (0.863) (0.864) (0.858) 
         
Marketing capabilities (before adoption)  0.054*  0.054*  0.256***  0.262*** 
  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.112) (0.109) 
Technical capabilities  (before adoption)  0.042  0.035  0.059  0.025 
  (0.036)  (0.035) (0.120) (0.035) 
PC banking experience  (before adoption)  0.098*  0.102**  -0.078  -0.088 
  (0.063)  (0.062) (0.156) (0.153) 
       
Degree of collaboration     0.031***  0.013  0.013 
    (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
       
Collaboration x Marketing capabilities      -0.044***  -0.045*** 
     (0.023)  (0.022) 
Collaboration x Technical capabilities      -0.007   
     (0.024)  
Collaboration x PC banking experience      0.038  0.040 * 
     (0.031)  (0.030) 
Outsourcing   -0.003***  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time of adoption  0.0004  0.0003  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size  (before adoption)  0.064***  0.069***  0.069***  0.069*** 
  (0.033)  (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
Privately held  (before adoption)  0.064  0.068  0.076  0.074 
  (0.098)  (0.096) (0.095) (0.094) 
Affluence of customers  (before adoption)  0.325  0.249  0.262  0.257 
  (0.306)  (0.303) (0.299) (0.298) 
Slack resources  (before adoption)  -2.460*  -2.440*  -2.737*  -2.739* 
  (1.729)  (1.706) (1.686) (1.687) 
Market size  (before adoption)  -0.008  -0.007  -0.003  -0.004 
  (0.033)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Concentration ratio  (before adoption)  0.038  0.074  0.058  0.049 
  (0.378)  (0.374) (0.369) (0.368) 
Market growth  (before adoption)   0.238  0.315  0.315  0.322 
  (0.470)  (0.465) (0.459) (0.459) 
Number of states of operation  (before adoption)  -0.010  -0.012  -0.010  -0.011 
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Number of external partners  -0.050  -0.058  -0.065*  -0.066* 
  (0.048)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
Correction for outsourcing self-selection (λ)  0.030  0.077 0.105 0.107 
  (0.197)  (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) 
       
Model log likelihood  -433.6  -431.2  -428.7  -428.8 
LR Chi-square (df)  33.8 (15) ***  38.7 (16)***  43.6 (19)***  43.5 (18)*** 
Log likelihood ratio (df) comparison of nested models    4.9 (1) **  
(v. M1) 
4.86 (3)  
(v. M2) 
4.78 (2) *  
(v. M2) 
****p<0.001; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 (one-tailed tests; unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in 
parentheses), n=153.   
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FIGURE 1. THE JOINT EFFECTS OF COLLABORATION AND CAPABILITIES ON 
INNOVATION ADOPTION* 
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1b. Impact of Collaboration and PC Banking Experience
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*The figures report the aggregate impact of the independent effects of capabilities and collaboration, 
as well as their interaction.   
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APPENDIX: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
COLLABORATION AND OUTSOURCING 
This appendix reports sensitivity analyses that assess the causal structure among our key variables, in order to 
identify possible relationships that may bias the results. First, following Poppo and Zenger (2002), we use a three-
stage simultaneous equation to test whether outsourcing and collaboration determine each other, as well as influence 
subsequent innovation adoption. If outsourcing and collaboration are linked, failure to model this relationship may 
introduce bias. Models 1 and 2 in Table A1 report no significant effect of collaboration on outsourcing or vice versa. 
Therefore, we conclude that outsourcing and collaboration do not simultaneously determine each other in their effect 
on innovation adoption. Further, the capability variables do not significantly impact collaboration. Three-stage least 
squares simultaneous equation models assume that dependent variables are normally distributed. In our case, the 
measure for innovation adoption is a count and the degree of outsourcing has values between 0 and 100, which are 
distributional properties for which binomial regression and Tobit are preferable to least squares (Greene, 2000). 
However, we could not identify studies that have modeled a three-stage simultaneous equation model with negative 
binomial, Tobit, and normal regression equations. 
Second, we attempted to identify potential biases that the outsourcing decision might introduce. Poppo and 
Zenger (2002: 715) use a Heckman sample selection test to assure absence of any selection bias that may occur by 
focusing on firms that have outsourced. In parallel, we conduct a Heckman analysis to determine whether factors that 
influence innovation adoption might change if degree of outsourcing is endogenous. Because a Heckman model 
requires a discrete variable (Greene, 2000), we compared firms with outsourcing levels of 50% and above to firms 
with levels of less than 50%. Fourteen firms outsourced less than 50% of their adoption, while 126 firms outsourced 
more than 50%. The skewed distribution reflects the fact that the innovation originated outside the banking industry, 
so that most banks chose a substantial degree of outsourcing. The first-stage Probit model yielding an inverse Mills 
ratio contains the same independent variables as model 2, with the exception of collaboration. When we included the 
Mills ratio λ for outsourcing in analyses that predicted extent of innovation adoption (Table 4 in the main paper), the 
variable was not significant and the results for our prediction remained the same. Therefore, consistent with Poppo 
and Zenger (2002) we decided not to include a Mills ratio for outsourcing in the analysis. 
We stress that our study has a different emphasis than Poppo and Zenger (2002). They investigate the joint 
effect of relational and contractual governance, after having tested for absence of sample selection bias resulting from 
outsourcing. They argue that once a firm decides to outsource, it will decide on contractual complexity and relational 
governance jointly. By contrast, our paper studies how collaboration influences innovation adoption, while controlling 
for extent of outsourcing; we do not examine the issue of contractual complexity in the governance decision.  
Third, we test for a sequential decision making relationship in which capabilities influence outsourcing, 
which then influences collaboration. We estimate a Tobit regression to predict degree of outsourcing, because the 
dependent variable has upper and lower bounds. We first use capabilities and control variables to predict outsourcing; 
we then use the predicted outsourcing variable to predict collaboration in an OLS regression model. Following prior 
research that has shown that capabilities influence firm governance choice (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 2003), 
we use capability variables as instruments in the equation predicting outsourcing. Model 4 in Table A2 shows that 
among the capability variables, only marketing capabilities significantly influence a firm’s outsourcing choice. By 
contrast, the coefficients for technical capabilities and PC banking are insignificant. Most importantly, the results of 
Model 5 show that the coefficient of predicted outsourcing is insignificant in the equation predicting collaboration, 
which implies that degree of collaboration is independent of a firm’s outsourcing choice. Therefore, we reject the idea 
that there is a sequential decision making relationship between outsourcing and collaboration. 
Fourth, model 6 assessed whether capabilities and outsourcing predicted collaboration directly, in order to 
further test our assumption that collaboration is a strategic choice rather than an endogenous outcome of prior firm 
capabilities and degree of outsourcing. We find that neither outsourcing nor the capability variables significantly 
influence collaboration. Moreover, the model shows that no capability variable predicts collaboration, again indicating 
that collaboration is exogenous to the capabilities-outsourcing relationship.  
Fifth, we tested the interaction between collaboration and outsourcing on innovation adoption to determine 
whether the marginal effects of collaboration (or outsourcing) rise as outsourcing (or collaboration) increases. We 
used the same predictor variables as in Model 2 of Table 4. The interaction effect was not significant, indicating that 
the impact of collaboration on innovation adoption does not vary as a function of outsourcing. Thus, collaboration 
positively influences innovation adoption independent of the choice of outsourcing vs. internal governance.   
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Table A1. Three-stage simultaneous model of potential endogeneity in the relationship between outsourcing 
and collaboration  
  Model 1 
Collaboration 
Model 2 
Outsourcing 
Model 3 
Innovation 
adoption 
Intercept  1.07 (3.82)  125.9 (22.9)****  15.71 (17.57) 
Marketing capabilities   0.14 (0.26)  -3.73 (2.69)  -0.37 (0.88) 
Technical capabilities   0.23 (0.22)  -3.32 (2.44)  -0.52 (0.72) 
PC banking experience  -0.22 (0.37)  2.15 (4.02)  1.69 (1.17) 
Size   0.05 (0.13)  -2.37 (1.27)*  0.53 (0.45) 
Time of adoption    0.24 (0.13)*   
Privately held status   -0.26 (0.65)  -12.03 (6.19)*  -1.18 (2.65) 
Affluence of customers   2.30 (1.38)*     
Asset specificity  0.64 (0.20)****  -5.74 (3.36)*   
Supplier uncertainty  0.03 (0.08)  0.15 (1.16)   
Slack resources  8.62 (8.56)  -40.30 (100.4)  -47.9 (30.1) 
Outsourcing  -0.01 (0.02)    -0.20 (0.15) 
Collaboration    0.85 (4.11)  2.30 (1.18)** 
Concentration ratio       0.88 (4.59) 
Market growth       0.79 (7.08) 
Number of states operating      -0.42 (0.53) 
Number of partners      -0.35 (0.96) 
      
Cases 153  153  153 
Chi-square 18.21*  24.25***  34.38**** 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 (two-tailed tests); unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) 
Conclusion: Collaboration and outsourcing do not cause each other (models 1 & 2) 
 
Table A2. Testing the sequential relationship between outsourcing and collaboration 
  Model 4 
Outsourcing 
Tobit 
Model 5 
Collaboration 
OLS 
Model 6 
Collaboration 
OLS 
Intercept  205.9 (51.4)****  5.17 (4.32)  1.06 (2.33) 
Marketing capabilities   -11.9 (6.01)**    0.09 (0.26) 
Technical capabilities   -5.25 (5.53)    0.24 (0.22) 
PC banking experience  8.73 (9.17)    -0.27 (0.38) 
Size   -4.85 (2.82)*  -0.09 (0.14)  0.02 (0.12) 
Time of adoption  0.51 (0.28)*  -0.002 (0.02)  0.01 (0.01) 
Privately held status   -23.7 (13.5)*  -0.53 (0.73)  -0.11 (0.60) 
Affluence of customers   -37.5 (39.3)  2.67 (1.81)  3.59 (1.63)** 
Asset specificity  -11.7 (6.23)*  0.39 (0.32)  0.59 (0.24)** 
Supplier uncertainty  -1.47 (2.62)  0.08 (0.12)  0.09 (0.11) 
Slack resources  40.9 (230.9)  2.86 (9.02)  3.60 (9.31) 
Predicted value of outsourcing 
from Model 4 
 -0.02  (0.02)   
Outsourcing     0.004  (0.01) 
Cases 153  153  153 
LR Chi-square  25.10****     
Log Likelihood  -361.94     
F- value    1.93*  1.48 
Adjusted R-Square    0.05  0.03 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 (two-tailed tests); unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) 
Conclusion: Degree of collaboration is independent of a firm’s expected outsourcing choice (model 5); capabilities 
and actual outsourcing do not predict collaboration (model 6). 
 